Core and no-treat equilibrium in tournament games with externalities by Mizuno, Ryo
CORE AND NO-TREAT EQUILIBRIUM IN
TOURNAMENT GAMES WITH EXTERNALITIES
RYO MIZUNO
Abstract. We consider a situation where coalitions are formed
to divide a resource. As in real life, the value of a payoff to a
given agent is allowed to depend on the payoff to other agents with
whom he shares a common interest. There are various notions of
equilibrium for this type of game, including the core and no-treat
equilibrium. These stabilities may exist or not, depending on the
power structure and the rule for allocating the resource. It is shown
that under certain conditions, the no-treat equilibrium can exist
even though the core is empty.
1. Introduction
Today, game theory is increasingly being used to model interactions
in social science, political science, psychology, and especially economics.
But it is actually a field of applied mathematics, one that attempts
to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations in which an
individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others.
The reasons I chose game theory for my master’s project were that
I got interested in it when I studied game theory in an undergraduate
political science class, and that it is closely related to our everyday
experience.
Although game theory is used in a lot of disciplines, it requires many
advanced mathematical techniques, such as analysis, linear algebra,
abstract algebra, and so on. However, game theory is often applied in
these disciplines without using those advanced techniques. So I would
like to extend my mathematical skills to consider one of the models in
economics which is coalition-formation.
Also, I would like to thank Professor Juarez and Professor Nation
who have been helping me a lot for this project. Without their help,
I cannot complete this project. Also, I would like to thank everyone
who helped for this project to complete.
Date: May 15, 2010.
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2. Definitions and concepts
We are going to analyze agents who are looking to maximize their
share of a divisible resource by being a singleton or forming coalitions.
Let M be a divisible resource, say money. Let N be a set of agents
N = {1, 2, ..., n}, and each agent has an additive preference on his share
of money and other agents’ shares. Each agent has a power described
as pi1, pi2, ..., pin with pii ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 pii = 1. Also, without loss of
generality, we assume that
∑
i∈S pii 6=
∑
j∈T pij for all S 6= T , so we do
not have any ties.
A partition is a collection of disjoint subsets S1, S2, .., Sk of N where⋃k
i=1 Si = N . Each subset Sj in the partition is called a coalition.
The power of a coalition S is given by pi(S) =
∑
i∈S pii. The winning
coalition for a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk) is the subset Sj with pi(Sj)
maximum.
The idea, of course, is that a group of agents might want to form
a coalition in order to win the game, or more generally, in order to
increase their net utilities (see below).
Let ζ be a function that specifies the allocations of the resource
across the winning agents. That is, for any agent i ∈ S ⊆ N , ζi(S)
is the allocation of the money to agent i with
∑n
i=1 ζi(S) = M when
coalition S is winning. We assume that ζ is cross-monotonic on the
size of the coalition, that is ζi(S) > ζi(T ) for i ∈ S ⊂ T.
We are going to consider two rules for dividing money to agents in
the winning coalition, which are equal sharing and proportional shar-
ing. Let me introduce these two sharing rules. Let S be the winning
coalition.
(1) Equal sharing is given by
ζi(S) =

M
|S| if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
So under equal sharing, all agents in the winning coalitions
share the same amount of the resource.
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(2) Proportional sharing is given by
ζi(S) =

pii
pi(S)
M if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
where pi(S) =
∑
j∈S pij for notational convenience. So under
proportional sharing, each agent’s share depends on his power
and the total power in the winning coalition.
There are other sharing rules besides above two rules, but we only
consider these two in this project.
Definition 1. Externality is basically a situation in which each agent
cares not only about himself, but also possibly cares about the other
agents. Those relationships are represented by an n × n matrix for
n agents, with entries mij representing the externality that agent j
imposes on agent i. The payoff function is a vector U = mx defined by
Ui(x1, x2, ..., xn) = (mx)i =
∑
jmijxj. We often assume that mii = 1
as a kind of normalization. In fact, whenever mii > 0 then you can
divide that row of m by mii and not change the results of the game.
Definition 2. For a partition Π, the net utility to agent i is vi(Π) =
(mζ)i =
∑
j∈S∗mijζj(S
∗) where S∗ is the coalition in Π with the largest
power. The object of the game is to maximize your net utility. That
is, agent i tries to find the partition that maximizes vi(Π). With ex-
ternalities, this is not the same as maximizing ζi(Π). Moreover, with
externalities, it is definitely not the same as winning in the sense of
being in the coalition with the most power.
Definition 3. The core is the set of all partitions with the property
that no subset S ⊆ N can improve their net utilities by forming a
coalition. That is, a partition Π is in the core (or Π is core-stable)
if there does not exist S ⊆ N such that vi(Π − S, S) > vi(Π) for all
i ∈ S. Thus there is no set of agents S that would be all be better off
by forming a coalition. (If Π = (T1, ..., Tn), then (Π−S, S) denotes the
partition (T1 − S, ...Tn − S, S).)
Definition 4. Similarly to the core, we define an alternative notion,
no-treat equilibrium, call it NTE, under which agents can react to a
deviation in a way that harms the agents who originally deviated.
So Π is NTE (or Π is NTE-stable) if whenever S ⊆ N is such that
vi(Π − S, S) > vi(Π) for all i ∈ S, then there exists T ⊆ N − S
such that vi(Π − (S ∪ T ), T, S) > vi(Π − S, S) for all i ∈ T and
vi(Π − (S ∪ T ), T, S) < vi(Π) for some i ∈ S. This means that at
least one member of S will in the long run not profit by deviating to
4 RYO MIZUNO
form the coalition S.
Note that the distinction between the core and NTE is that with
a core-stable partition, no group can gain an advantage by forming a
new coalition. With an NTE-stable partition, it may be possible for
a group to deviate and gain a temporary advantage by forming a new
coalition - but if they do so, then yet another coalition can form to
punish them.
Definition 5. A minimally winning coalition is a winning coalition
S∗ ⊆ N satisfying pi(S∗) > 1/2 > pi(S∗ − {j}) for all j ∈ S∗.
Definition 6. A minimally winning coalition of minimal size is a min-
imally winning coalition S∗ ⊆ N satisfying |S∗| ≤ |S| for all S ⊆ N
with S minimally winning. This is used under the equal sharing.
Definition 7. The minimally winning coalition of minimal weight is
minimally winning coalition T ∗ ⊆ N such that pi(T ∗) ≤ pi(T ) for all
T ⊆ N minimally winning. This is used under the proportional sharing.
With these definitions, what we are going to consider is the following:
• Does there always exist a core-stable partition?
• Can we characterize the set of rules sufficient to have a core-
stable partition?
• Does there always exist a NTE-stable partition?
• Can we characterize the set of rules sufficient to have a NTE-
stable partition?
3. No externalities
Observe that, if there are no externalities, then as we increase the
size of a coalition any winning agent is worse off (because his share
decreases), and agents who are not winning would prefer to be winning
(because their net utility is zero when losing). This will also be true in
the case with externalities under weak conditions.
3.1. Equally shared case. For equally shared case, we cannot guar-
antee that the core always exists. However, NTE always exists. Here
is an example where the core does not exist, but NTE exists.
Example 8. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and pi =
(.36, .335, .12, .105, .08). Then each of the following are partitions with
minimally winning coalitions. Now, consider whether these minimally
winning coalitions are in the core or NTE.
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• Consider the partition ({1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}). It is not in the core,
because if agent 1 deviates, then he wins: pi(1) = .36, pi(2) =
.335, pi(3, 4, 5) = .305. However, it is NTE because if he devi-
ates, then the rest can punish him: in fact, agent 2 can combine
with any of 3,4,5 to beat him.
• Consider the partition ({1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}). It is not in the core:
agent 1 cannot deviate by himself, since pi(2, 5) = .415. But
he could form a coalition with either agent 3 or 4 that would
win. However, if he does so, then the remaining three agents
can form a coalition to beat him. So it is NTE.
• ({1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}) is not in the core: agent 1 can form a new
coalition with agent 2 to get more benefit. He could form a
coalition with either agent 4 or 5 that would win. However, if
he does so, then the remaining three agents can form a coalition
to beat him. So it is NTE.
• Similarly above, ({2, 3, 4}, {1, 5}), ({2, 4, 5}, {1, 3}), ({1, 3, 5}, {2, 4}),
and ({2, 3, 5}, {1, 4}) is NTE, but not in the core because agent
1 and 2 can be together.
As we have seen above, this game has NTE, for example ({1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}).
However, there does not exist any core-stable partition because agent(s)
in the winning coalition can always deviate. So we found an example
that has NTE and empty core.
We are going to characterize below the set of tournaments that have
a core-stable partition for equal sharing. Before that, I would like to
state a lemma. For next three lemma and propositions, we assume that
there is no externality, mii > 0 for all i, and the rule is equally shared.
Lemma 9. For either equal sharing or proportional sharing,
(1) if S is a winning coalition and S is contained in T properly,
then each member of S is worse off (has a lower net utility) in
T than in S.
(2) Each agent would prefer to be winning rather than losing.
Proof. Both (1) and (2) are clear in case with no externalities. However
this is not very clear in case with externalities. I will show that in
lemma 24. 
Proposition 10. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} and pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin). If
pii >
1
2
for some i, then ({i}, S1, S2, ..., Sm) is always in the core (and
so in NTE) where Sj ⊆ N − {i} and Sj ∩ Sk = ∅.
Proof. This proposition follows from the definition of the core immedi-
ately.
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
It is clear that proposition 10 can be applied to the proportionally
shared case. Next, we look at a different case.
Proposition 11. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3) with 12 > pi1 >
pi2 > pi3. Then ({1}, {2, 3}) is always in the core, and any partition
with one coalition and a singleton is in NTE. This proposition only
applies for equal sharing rule.
Proof. This depends only on lemma 9. Since we have 1
2
> pi1 > pi2 > pi3,
we know that no agent can win the game being singleton. Now, consider
some coalitions. If we have Π = ({1, 2}, {3}), then 1 can deviate, so
this is not in the core. But if agent 1 deviates, then agent 2 can form a
coalition with agent 3 and this leads agent 1 to lose. Therefore, agent
1 does not want to deviate from Π = ({1, 2}, {3}), Hence Π is in NTE.
The same thing will happen if we have Π = ({1, 3}, {2}). However if
we have ({1}, {2, 3}), then agent 2 and 3 are better off, so ({1}, {2, 3})
is in the core, so in NTE. 
Proposition 12. For equal sharing with no externality, we have the
following results.
(1) If Π is in the core, then Π = (S∗, S1, ..., Sk) with S∗ a winning
coalition pi(S∗) > 1/2 of minimal size.
(2) If Π = (S∗, S1, ...Sk) is in the core with S∗ winning, then Π
′
=
(S∗, N − S∗) is also in the core.
(3) Π = (S∗, N − S∗) is in the core if and only if there are not
subsets T ⊆ S∗ and U ⊆ N−S∗ such that pi(T ∪U) > pi(S∗−T )
with |T ∪ U | < |S∗| and pi(T ∪ U) > pi(N − S − U) for some
U ⊆ N − S∗.
Proof. (1) This is clear since otherwise some new coalition can form
to beat S∗.
(2) This is also obvious since otherwise any new coalition that could
form to beat S∗ in Π
′
, could also form to beat it in Π.
(3) (⇐) Suppose that S∗ be the minimally winning coalition of min-
imal size, and there is no subset T ⊆ S∗ such that pi(T ∪ U) >
pi(S∗ − T ) with |T ∪ U | < |S∗| and pi(T ∪ U) > pi(N − S − U)
for some U ⊆ N − S∗. This condition implies that no agent in
S∗ wants to deviate since deviation makes his payoff lower. It
follows that all agents in the winning coalition S∗ are better off
in S∗, that is, there is no subset T ⊆ N such that vi(Π−T, T ) >
vi(Π) for all i ∈ S, and it follows that {S∗, N − S∗} is in the
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core by definition.
(⇒) Suppose that Π = {S∗, S1, S2, ..., Sm} is a core-stable par-
tition where S∗ has the largest power and is of the minimal size.
Then each agent in S∗ will get M/|S∗| for which they are bet-
ter off. Now suppose for a contradiction that there is a subset
T ⊆ S∗ such that pi(T ∪U) > pi(S∗−T ) with |T ∪U | < |S∗| and
pi(T ∪U) > pi(N − S −U) for some U ⊆ N − S∗ Then agent in
the coalition T ∪U gets M/|T ∪U | which is greater than M/|S∗|
because we know that |T ∪ U | < |S∗|. This contradicts that all
agents in S∗ are better off with M/|S∗|. Hence if the core is
nonempty, then we have there is no subset T ⊆ S∗ such that
pi(T ∪U) > pi(S∗−T ) with |T ∪U | < |S∗| for some U ⊆ N−S∗.

We have found some conditions of tournament games to have a core-
stable partition for equal sharing case. In particular, we found that
the core is nonempty when n = 3, and may be empty when n = 5.
What happens when n = 4? I will leave this question for the future
work. But next proposition shows that NTE is always nonempty for
this case.
Proposition 13. Under the equal sharing rule, if S∗ is minimally win-
ning coalition of minimal size, then any partition with S∗ is NTE.
Proof. Let S∗ be a minimally winning coalition of minimal size. Since
we know that |S∗| ≤ |S| for all S ⊆ N with S minimally winning,
we get vi(S
∗) > vj(S) for i ∈ S∗ and j ∈ S. Now, we also know
that pi(S∗) > 1/2 > pi(S∗ − {j}) for all j ∈ S∗. This implies that
pi(S∗−{j}) < pi(N−S∗∪{j}). Hence ({S∗}, {N−S∗}) is in NTE. 
3.2. Proportionally shared case. Next, we look at the proportion-
ally shared case. The proportionally shared case is slightly more com-
plicated than equally shared case. It does not only depend on the
power structure of the whole set N , but also the power structure of the
coalition.
Proposition 14. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} and pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin). If
pii >
1
2
for some i, then ({i}, S1, S2, ..., Sm) is always in the core (and so
in NTE) where Sj ⊆ N − pii and Sj ∩ Sk = ∅ in proportionally shared
case.
Proof. As in proposition 10, this also follows from the definition of the
core. 
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Proposition 15. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3) with 12 > pi1 >
pi2 > pi3. then Π1 = ({1}, {2, 3}) is always in the core, and NTE coin-
cides with the core in proportionally shared case.
Proof. For the core, it is obvious as in proposition 11. We need to show
that Π2 = ({1, 2}, {3}) and Π3 = ({1, 3}, {2}) are not in NET. Since
we have v2(Π1) = pi2/(pi1 +pi2) > v2(Π2) = pi2/(pi2 +pi3), agent 2 prefers
to form a coalition with agent 3. Hence Π2 is not in NTE. Similarly,
we have v3(Π1) = pi3/(pi2 + pi3) > v3(Π3) = pi3/(pi1 + pi3), so agent 3
prefers to form a coalition with agent 2. Hence Π3 is not in NTE. Hence
Π1 = ({1}, {2, 3}) is always in the core, and NTE coincides with the
core in proportionally shared case. 
Proposition 16. For proportional sharing with no externality, we have
the following results.
(1) If Π is in the core, then Π = (S∗, S1, ..., Sk) with S∗ a winning
coalition pi(S∗) > 1/2 of minimal weight.
(2) If Π = (S∗, S1, ...Sk) is in the core with S∗ winning, then Π
′
=
(S∗, N − S∗) is also in the core.
(3) Π = {S∗, N −S∗} is in the core if and only if there is no subset
T ⊆ S∗ such that pi(T ∪U) > pi(S∗−T ) with pi(T ∪U) < pi(S∗)
and pi(T ∪ U) > pi(N − S − U) for some U ⊆ N − S∗.
Proof. (1) This is clear since otherwise some new coalition can form
to beat S∗.
(2) This is also obvious since otherwise any new coalition that could
form to beat S∗ in Π
′
, could also form to beat it in Π.
(3) (⇐) Suppose that S∗ be the minimally winning coalition of
minimal weight, and there is no subset T ⊆ S∗ such that
pi(T ∪ U) > pi(S∗ − T ) with pi(T ∪ U) < pi(S∗) and pi(T ∪ U) >
pi(N − S − U) for some U ⊆ N − S∗. This condition implies
that no agent in S∗ wants to deviate since deviation makes his
payoff lower. It follows that all agents in the winning coalition
S∗ are better off in S∗, that is, there is no subset T ⊆ N such
that vi(Π − T, T ) > vi(Π) for all i ∈ S, and it follows that
{S∗, N − S∗} is in the core by definition.
(⇒) Suppose that Π = {S∗, S1, S2, ..., Sm} is a core-stable par-
tition where S∗ has the largest power and is of the minimal
weight. Then each agent j in S∗ will get pijM/|pi(S∗)| for
which they are better off. Now suppose for a contradiction
that there is a subset T ⊆ S∗ such that pi(T ∪ U) > pi(S∗ − T )
with pi(T ∪ U) < pi(S∗) and pi(T ∪ U) > pi(N − S − U) for
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some U ⊆ N − S∗ Then agent j in the coalition T ∪ U gets
pijM/pi(T ∪ U) which is greater than pijM/|pi(S∗)| because we
know that pi(T ∪ U) < pi(S∗). This contradicts that all agents
in S∗ are better off with pijM/|pi(S∗)|. Hence if the core is
nonempty, then we have there is no subset T ⊆ S∗ such that
pi(T ∪ U) > pi(S∗ − T ) with pi(T ∪ U) < pi(S∗) and pi(T ∪ U) >
pi(N − S − U) for some U ⊆ N − S∗.

Proposition 17. For proportionally shared case, the minimally win-
ning coalition of minimal weight is always in NTE.
Proof. Let S∗ be the minimally winning coalition of minimal weight.
Since we know that pi(S∗) ≤ pi(S) for all S ⊆ N minimally winning,
we get vi(S
∗) > vj(S) for i ∈ S∗ and j ∈ S. Now, we also know that
pi(S∗) > 1/2 > pi(S∗−{j}) for all j ∈ S∗. It follows that pi(S∗−{j}) <
pi(N−S∗∪{j}), that is, deviation makes the coalition S∗ losing. Hence
the partition ({S∗}, {N − S∗}) is NTE. 
We have found some conditions of tournament games to have a core-
stable and NTE-stable partitions for proportional sharing case. The
question is what is the smallest N such that the core can be empty in
the proportionally shared case? I will leave this question for the future
work.
4. With externality
Now, we consider the cases with externality. That means each agent
cares not only about his own share, but also possibly cares about the
other agents’ shares. This relationship is represented by an n×n matrix
for n agents. Let’s look at some examples of the externality matrix to
see what kind of power structures makes the core empty, but NTE
exists.
Example 18. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} where agents 1 and 2 are
Muslims, and agents 3 and 4 are Catholic. Agents 1 and 2 care about
each other, but do not care about 3 and 4. Similarly, agents 3 and 4
care about each other, but do not care about 1 and 2. In this case, the
externality matrix could be following:
m =

1 α 0 0
α 1 0 0
0 0 1 β
0 0 β 1

with 1 > α > 0 and 1 > β > 0.
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4.1. Equally shared case. Observe that for what pi the core is nonempty.
Since agents 1 and 2 prefer to form a coalition and so do agents 3 and
4, then for equal sharing, the final benefit will be the following.
If {1,2} are the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U1(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
(1 + α)
U2(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
(1 + α)
If {3,4} are the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U3(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
(1 + β)
U4(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
(1 + β)
Let pi = (.40, .22, .28, .10). Observe some partitions. It is not hard to
see that the only possible partition to have core-stable partition and
NTE is ({1, 2}, {3, 4}). For this coalition, agent 1 prefers to be a
singleton, but cannot deviate because pi1 < pi2 + pi3 + pi4. So for this pi
this game has NTE, but the core is empty.
4.2. Proportionally shared case. Let pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) and
observe the payoff.
U1 = x1 + αx2 U2 = αx1 + x2
U3 = x3 + βx4 U4 = βx3 + x4
In this case, xi depends on pi, α, and β. If pi = (.40, .39, .11, .10),
α = 1/10, and β = 1/10, then agent 1 might prefer to form a coalition
with agent 3 instead of agent 2 since
v1({1, 2}, {3, 4}) = 40
40 + 39
+
1
10
39
40 + 39
' 0.56,
and
v1({1, 3}, {2, 4}) = 40
40 + 11
' 0.78,
so
v1({1, 2}, {3, 4}) < v1({1, 3}, {2, 4}).
In particular, if we have
pi1
pi1 + pi3
>
pi1
pi1 + pi2
(1 + α), then we can
guarantee that agent 1 prefers to form a coalition with agent 3
because v1({1, 2}{3, 4}) < v1({1, 3}{2, 4}).
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Example 19. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} with agents 1 and 2 are Yan-
kees fans, and agents 3 and 4 are Mets fans. Agents 1 and 2 do not
care about each other, but dislike agents 3 and 4. Similarly, agents 3
and 4 do not care about each other, but hate agents 1 and 2. In this
case, the externality matrix could be following,
m =

1 0 β β
0 1 β β
α α 1 0
α α 0 1

with α < 0 and β < 0.
4.3. Equally shared case. Similarly to the previous case, agents 1
and 2 prefer to form a coalition and so do agents 3 and 4. Then for
equal sharing, the final benefit will be the following.
If {1,2} is the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U1(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
U2(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
U3(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) = α < 0 U4(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) = α < 0
If {3,4} is the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U1(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = β < 0 U2(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = β < 0
U3(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
U4(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
Let pi = (.40, .22, .28, .10) as before. Observe some partitions. It is not
hard to see that the only possible coalition to have core and NTE is
({1, 2}, {3, 4}). For this coalition, agent 1 prefers to be a singleton,
but cannot deviate because pi1 < pi2 + pi3 + pi4. So for this pi this game
has NTE, but the core is empty.
4.4. Proportionally shared case. Let pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) and
observe the payoff.
U1 = x1 + βx3 + βx4 U2 = x2 + βx3 + βx4
U3 = αx1 + αx2 + x3 U4 = αx1 + αx2 + x4
As in the previous example, xi depends on pi, α, and β. But since
β < 0, agent 1 can hardly form a coalition with agent 3. Agent 1’s
payoff does not depend on α, we only consider pi and β. Let
pi = (.40, .39, .11, .10). Then if we have
pi1
pi1 + pi3
(1 + β) >
pi1
pi1 + pi2
,
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then we can guarantee that agent 1 prefers to form a coalition with
agent 3 because v1({1, 2}{3, 4}) < v1({1, 3}{2, 4}).
Example 20. Let’s look at one more example, which is N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
with agents 1 and 2 are Muslim, and agents 3 and 4 are Jewish. Agents
1 and 2 care about each other, but dislike agents 3 and 4. Similarly,
agents 3 and 4 care about each other, but dislike agents 1 and 2. In
this case, the externality matrix could be following,
m =

1 α β β
α 1 β β
γ γ 1 δ
γ γ δ 1

with 1 > α > 0, β < 0, γ < 0, and 1 > δ > 0.
4.5. Equally shared case. Observe for what pi is core nonempty. In
this case agents 1 and 2 strongly prefer to form a coalition and so do
agents 3 and 4, the final benefit will be the following.
If {1,2} are the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U1(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
(1 + α) U2(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) =
1
2
(1 + α)
U3(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) = γ < 0 U4(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0) = γ < 0
If {3,4} is the coalition with the largest power, then we have
U1(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = β < 0 U2(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = β < 0
U3(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
(1 + δ) U4(0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
2
(1 + δ)
4.6. Proportionally shared case. Let pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) and
observe the payoff.
U1 = x1 + αx2 + βx3 + βx4 U2 = αx1 + x2 + βx3 + βx4
U3 = γx1 + γx2 + x3 + δx4 U4 = γx1 + γx2 + δx3 + x4
In this case it is very hard for agent 1 to form a coalition with agent 3
and 4 because they are going to harm agent 1. But if we let
pi = (.40, .39, .05, .16), α = 1/10, and β = −1/10, then agent 1 might
prefer to form a coalition with agent 3 instead of agent 2 since
v1({1, 2}, {3, 4}) = 40
40 + 39
+
1
10
39
40 + 39
' 0.56,
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and
v1({1, 3}, {2, 4}) = 40
40 + 5
− 1
10
5
40 + 5
' 0.8,
so
v1({1, 2}, {3, 4}) < v1({1, 3}, {2, 4}).
In particular, if we have
pi1
pi1 + pi3
(1 + β) >
pi1
pi1 + pi2
(1 + α) then we
can guarantee that agent 1 prefers to form a coalition with agent 3
because v1({1, 2}{3, 4}) < v1({1, 3}{2, 4}).
We have seen several examples to see how externality works in tour-
nament games. Now, let’s look at a specific example which has no NTE
and empty core.
Example 21. We consider the model with following externality matrix
for equally shared case;
m =
 1 13 00 1 1
3
1
3
0 1

and pi = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Suppose agents 1 and 2 form a coalition. Then the net utility is going
to be
U1(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0) = 1× 1
2
+
1
3
× 1
2
+ 0× 0 = 2
3
U2(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0) = 0× 1
2
+ 1× 1
2
+
1
3
× 0 = 1
2
U3(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0) =
1
3
× 1
2
+ 0× 1
2
+ 1× 0 = 1
6
In this case, agent 2 can deviate and form a new coalition with agent
3 to get more benefit.
U1(0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = 1× 0 + 1
3
× 1
2
+ 0× 1
2
=
1
6
U2(0,
1
2
,
1
2
) = 0× 0 + 1× 1
2
+
1
3
× 1
2
=
2
3
U3(0,
1
2
,
1
2
) =
1
3
× 0 + 0× 1
2
+ 1× 1
2
=
1
2
In this case, agent 3 can deviate and form a new coalition with 1 to
get more benefit.
U1(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
) = 1× 1
2
+
1
3
× 0 + 0× 1
2
=
1
2
U2(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
) = 0× 1
2
+ 1× 0 + 1
3
× 1
2
=
1
6
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U3(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
) =
1
3
× 1
2
+ 0× 0 + 1× 1
2
=
2
3
In this case, agent 1 can deviate and form a new coalition with agent
2 to get more benefit. Therefore, this particular example has no NTE
and empty core.
Note that this situation is called a cycle. The cycle is a property of
the externality matrix, not the game. Although it occurs in more than
three agents case, I will state the condition for n = 3.
Let
m =
 1 m12 m13m21 1 m23
m31 m32 1

be externality matrix where
∑
i 6=j |mij| < 1. There are two possibilities
to have cycle, the one is m12 > m13,m23 > m21,m31 > m32, and the
other is m12 < m13,m23 < m21,m31 < m32.
Lemma 22. If n = 3 and there is a cycle in the externality matrix,
and if pii < 1/2 for all i, then there is no partition in NTE.
Proof. If pii < 1/2, then a coalition has to be formed to be in NTE.
However in no coalition, agents are better off since we know that
v1({1, 2}, {3}) > v1({1, 3}, {2}), v2({2, 3}, {1}) > v2({1, 2}, {3}),
v3({1, 3}, {2}) > v3({2, 3}, {1}) if m12 > m13,m23 > m21,m31 > m32.
Also, v1({1, 2}, {3}) < v1({1, 3}, {2}), v2({2, 3}, {1}) < v2({1, 2}, {3}),
v3({1, 3}, {2}) < v3({2, 3}, {1}) if m12 < m13,m23 < m21,m31 < m32
Hence there is no partition in NTE. 
Above, we looked at simple externality matrices. Next I would like
to observe a general case of a two-person game.
Example 23. Let pi = (pi1, pi2) and assume without loss of generality
pi1 > pi2. Consider the following externality matrix,
m =
[
α1 α2
β1 β2
]
Then their final utilities are the followings.
U1(x1, x2) = α1 × x1 + α2 × x2
U2(x1, x2) = β1 × x1 + β2 × x2
(1) Equally shared case
Let Π1 = ({1}, {2}) and Π2 = ({1, 2}). Then v1(Π1) = α1,
v2(Π1) = β1, v1(Π2) = α1/2 + α2/2, and v2(Π2) = β1/2 + β2/2.
If α1 > α2, then agent 1 wants Π1. Hence Π1 is in the core. If
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α1 < α2, then agent 1 prefers Π2. If also β2 > β1, then both
prefer Π2 so that is in the core. If α1 < α2 but β2 < β1, then
agent 1 wants Π2 and agent 2 wants Π1. Hence Π1 is in the
core. And Π2 is not, since agent 2 could improve his share by
deviating.
(2) Proportionally shared case
Let Π1 = ({1}, {2}) and Π2 = ({1, 2}). Then v1(Π1) = α1,
v2(Π1) = β1, v1(Π2) = α1pi1 + α2pi2, and v2(Π2) = β1pi1 + β2pi2.
If α1 > α2pi2/(1 − pi1), then agent 1 wants Π1. Hence Π1 is in
the core. If α1 < α2pi2/(1 − pi1), then agent 1 prefers Π2. If
also β1 < β2pi2/(1 − pi1), then both prefer Π2 so that is in the
core. If α1 < α2pi2/(1− pi1) but β1 > β2pi2/(1− pi1), then agent
1 wants Π2 and agent 2 wants Π1. Hence Π2 is in the core. And
Π1 is not, since agent 1 could improve his share by forming a
coalition.
We have seen more general case of externality in example 23. Next,
I would like to state a lemma.
Lemma 24. Let S ⊆ N . Assume that whenever i ∈ S ⊆ N and
j 6∈ S, we have mij <
∑
k∈S
mik
|S| for equally shared case and mij <∑
k∈S
mik
|pi(S)| for proportionally shared case. Then as we increase the
size of coalition, any winning agent is worse off (cross-monotonicity)
for both equal sharing and proportional sharing cases.
Proof. First, prove for equally shared case. For an agent i ∈ S, the net
utility in the coalition S is Ui =
∑
k∈Smik
M
|S| . For the same agent, in the
coalition S ∪ {j}, the net utility is U ′i =
∑
k∈S∪jmik
M
|S|+1 . Subtracting
and simplifying, Ui − U ′i = M|S|+1(
∑
k∈S
mik
|S| − mij). So Ui − U ′i > 0
whenever mij <
∑
k∈S
mik
|S| .
Next, we prove for proportionally shared case. For an agent i ∈
S, the net utility in the coalition S is Ui =
∑
k∈Smik
piiM
|pi(S)| . For
the same agent, in the coalition S ∪ {j}, the net utility is U ′i =∑
k∈S∪jmik
piiM
|pi(S∪{j})| . Subtracting and simplifying,
Ui − U ′i = M|pi(S∪{j})|(
∑
k∈S
mik
|pi(S)| − mij). So Ui − U ′i > 0 whenever
mij <
∑
k∈S
mik
|pi(S)| . 
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This lemma can be applied to the case with mii = 1 and
∑
i 6=j |mij| <
1. Now we are interested in finding a set of externality matrices for
which we can guarantee that the core is empty or nonempty for any pi.
Theorem 25. In the case with externality, we have the following re-
sults.
(1) If n = 2, 3, then any matrix of the form
m =
 1 ε εε 1 ε
ε ε 1

always has a nonempty core for any pi in both equal sharing and
proportional sharing.
(2) Let n = 3 and
m =
 1 m12 m13m21 1 m23
m31 m32 1

where m12 6= m13 and m21 6= m23 and m31 6= m32 and
∑
i 6=j |mij| <
1. Then we can find pi such that (pi,M) has empty core in both
sharing rules.
Proof. (1) By the previous example, we can conclude that the core
is always nonempty for any  for two-person game. For three-
person game, if ε > 1, then it is clear that Π = ({1, 2, 3}) is in
the core because all three agents share the same amount, 1/3 +
ε/3+ε/3 > 1/2+ε/2 > 1. If ε < 1 let pi = {pi1, pi2, pi3} with pi1 >
pi2 > pi3. For this externality matrix, we get U1(x1, x2, x3) =
x1 + εx2 + εx3, U2(x1, x2, x3) = εx1 + x2 + εx3, U3(x1, x2, x3) =
εx1+εx2+x3. Therefore, it does not matter with which agent to
form a coalition, their share will be the same. It follows that this
game can be now treated as if this was not an externality case
except for the final benefit. If we have pi1 >
1
2
and ε < 1, then we
are done because agent 1 can be a singleton as in proposition 10
for equal sharing and in proposition 14 for proportional sharing.
Next, suppose that we have pi1 <
1
2
. Then by example 11 and
15, we know that ({2, 3}, {1}) is in the core. Hence any matrix
of this form has a nonempty core if n = 2, 3 in both sharing
rules.
(2) Let
m =
 1 m12 m13m21 1 m23
m31 m32 1

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be externality matrix, not all mij’s are the same. First, consider
the equal sharing rule, then we get U1(x1, x2, x3) = x1+m12x2+
m13x3, U2(x1, x2, x3) = m21x1 + x2 + m23x3, U3(x1, x2, x3) =
m31x1 +m32x2 +x3. First of all, we have seen that if we have a
cycle in the externality matrix and pii < 1/2 for i = 1, 2, 3, then
clearly we have an empty core. There are two possibilities to
have cycle, the one is m12 > m13,m23 > m21,m31 > m32, and
the other is m12 < m13,m23 < m21,m31 < m32. Let’s look at
mij’s which do not make cycles.
Case 1: Supposem12 > m13. Then ifm21 > m23, then ({1, 2}, {3})
will be the winning coalition and if we let pi1 > pi2 > pi3, the
game has an empty core. If m21 < m23, then we have m31 < m32
in order not to have a cycle. Then ({2, 3}, {1}) will be the win-
ning coalition and if we let pi2 > pi3 > pi1, the game has an
empty core.
Case 2: Supposem12 < m13. Then ifm31 > m32, then ({1, 3}, {2})
will be the winning coalition and if we let pi1 > pi3 > pi2, the
game has an empty core. If m31 < m32, then we have m21 < m23
in order not to have a cycle. Then ({2, 3}, {1}) will be the win-
ning coalition and if we let pi2 > pi3 > pi1, the game has an
empty core. Hence for any matrix of this form, we can find pi
such that (pi,M) has empty core in equally shared case.
For proportional sharing case, we can apply above results to
find pi to make the core empty. For example, in case 1 we found
that if m12 > m13 and m21 > m23, then pi1 > pi2 > pi3 makes
the core empty. If we let pi1 = pi2 + δ = pi3 + 2δ for very small δ,
then the result is the same as in the equally shared case. Do the
same thing to all the cases that we found in equally shared case,
and we conclude that for any matrix of this form, we can find pi
such that (pi,M) has empty core in proportionally shared case.
Hence any matrix of this form has a nonempty core if n = 2, 3
in both sharing rules.

5. Conclusions and future work
We have been considering two sharing rules to analyze agents who
are looking to maximize their share of a divisible resource by being a
singleton or forming coalitions. We considered two cost sharing rules,
and characterize the existence of the core and NTE. This is a good
start for analyzing strategic situations. For the possible extensions of
this project, we have the alternate equilibrium besides the core and
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NTE. We can also consider the different ζ (cost sharing rules). I can
think of one possible cost sharing rule, which is inversely proportional
sharing. I am going to analyze that for what pi and externality the
game has nonempty core or empty core. And, of course, I need to
prove the theorem 25 for more than three-person game. There should
be a lot to be done beyond this project. I am looking to complete these
extensions of this project in the near future.
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